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THE FIREFIGHTERS' REFERENDUM -
SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISING FROM
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BE EXCLUDED FROM
REFERENDA HELD UNDER THE CITIZENS
INITIATED REFERENDA ACT 1993?
Gabriela Wehrle*
The New Zealand Professional Fire»hters' Union initiated the.first referendum held under
the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. This paper examines the question whether that
referendum demonstrated a need to reform the Act to restrict the subject-matter of future
referenda under the Act. The analysis is conducted in the context of the history and aims of
the Act and of the firefighters' dispute. The paper provides a case study of New Zealand's
first citizen initiated referendum.
The New Zealand Professional Firefighters' Union initiated the first referendum (the
"Firefighters' Referendum") to be held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (CIR
Act).1 The question put to voters at the referendum was "[s]hould the number of
professional firefighters employed full-time in the New Zealand Fire Service be reduced
below the number employed on 1 January 1995?".2 The referendum attracted much
criticism. Government Ministers pronounced the subject of the referendum unsuitable for
* This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the legal writing requirement of the LLB(Hons)
degree.
1 The term "referendum" is used here in the sense of a popular vote, rather than in the narrower
sense of a vote by electors on a measure proposed or enacted by the Government. Clearly the
word in its narrower sense would inaccurately describe the direct democracy device embodied
in the CIR Act, since popular votes under this Act are on questions initiated by electors. These
types of popular votes are most accurately described as initiatives, however they will be
referred to as referenda in this paper for consistency with popular terminology.
2 [1995] 1 New Zealand Gazette 387.
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public consideration and described it as a waste of public funds.3 The Prime Minister
called for questions arising from industrial disputes to be excluded from referenda held
under the CIR Act.4 Opposition MPs claimed that the Government's cynical attitude
toward the referendum demonstrated its lack of commitment to direct democracy.5
This paper examines the validity of the Prime Minister's assertion that the Firefighters'
Referendum highlighted a need to further restrict the subject-matter of referenda held under
the CIR Act. It does not aim to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the CIR Act in
general.6
I THE CITIZENS INITIATED REFERENDA ACT 1993
A History Of the Legislation
New Zealand suffered a "crisis in democracy" after the fourth Labour Government
executed its radical liberal programme without an electoral mandate in the mid to late
19802 This spurred calls for constitutional reform as a means of making the Executive
more accountable. The subsequent National Government's decision to continue with
intensive free market reforms, thereby breaking election promises, intensified these calls.
The "heavy handed" sale of state assets has been cited as the factor which most seriously
eroded public confidence in the electoral system.8
It was during this period of disillusionment that a number of groups built public
support for direct democracy as a means of enhancing elector participation in public
3 Minister of Internal Affairs, Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New Zealand) 29
November 1995; Minister of Justice, Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New
Zealand) 4 December 1995.
4 "Referendum Law Up for Review" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 December
1995, 1; The Minister of Internal Affairs also called for subject-matter restrictions. Radio New
Zealand Interview (Good Morning New Zealand) 29 November 1995.
5 Hon Winston Peters, MP, Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New Zealand) 29
November 1995; Rod Donald (Alliance Spokesperson on Electoral and Parliamentary Reform)
Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New Zealand) 4 December 1995.
6 For a comprehensive discussion on the CIR Act and its constitutional context, see M Gobbi The
Quest for Ligitimacy: A Comparative Study of the Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California
and New Zealand LLM thesis held by Victoria University of Weltington, 1994.
7 J Kelsey Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/ New Zealand (Bridget Williams
Books Ltd, Wellington, 1993) 160-161.
8 (1992) 522 NZPD 6713 (Chris Fletcher, MP).
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policy making. They achieved this by raising public awareness of the various devices and
promoting the advantages of direct democracy.9
In 1985 the Labour Government established the Royal Commission on Electoral
Reform. Included in its terms of reference was a direction to assess whether greater use
should be made of referenda and whether the results of referenda should be legislatively
binding.10 In its 1986 report, the Royal Commission recommended that legislation
allowing the public to initiate referenda not be enacted.11 It reported that even non-
binding referenda would derogate from government accountability.12 The Commission
was concerned that referenda could be misused as political tools.13 It saw non-binding
referenda as merely another means of surveying public opinion, for which adequate
mechanisrns already existed.14 The Commission was concerned that minority rights could
be threatened by the majoritarian potential of direct democracy.15 Practical problems,
such as the difficulty in framing a precise and easily understood question, also told against
direct democracy.16 The recommendation against legislation allowing public petitions to
compel referenda was endorsed by the Electoral Law Committee.17
In spite of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, persistent campaigning by
National Party member Merv Rusk, supported by the party wing, lead National to include
a promise to introduce non-binding direct democracy legislation in its 1990 election
manifesto.18
The CIR Act was enacted as part of the constitutional reform package which also
included the introduction of proportional representation in the form of the Mixed Member
Proportional (MMP) system of election. The aims of the CIR Act, as distilled from the
speeches made in Parliament during its passage, were; to provide a mechanism for the voice
9 Above n 6, 212.
10 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government
Print, Wellington, 1986) 167.
11 Above n 10, para 7.31.
12 Above n 10, para 7.23.
13 Above n 10, para 7.26.
14 Above n 10, para 7.25.
15 Above n 10, para 7.27.
16 Above n 10, para 7.28.
17 Report of the Electoral Law Committee: Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Commission on the
Electoral System (Government Print, Wellington, 1988) para 9.1.16.
18 Above n 6, 220-242.
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of the people to be heard,19 to facilitate healthy debate, to test public opinion more
accurately than could be tested through an opinion poll2o and to help ensure that the will
of the people prevails, rather than that of their elected representatives.21 It was described
as an "...attempt to give people who feel somewhat disfranchised and that they are not
listened to at the present time an opportunity to raise an issue which they believe to be
important...".22
Opposition MPs have since challenged National's commitment to direct democracy.23
Hon Dr Michael Cullen, MP, has criticised the CIR Act as "an ill-thought-out piece of
electioneering".24
B The Referendum Process
1 Initiating a referendum
A referendum is triggered under the CIR Act by five main steps;25
(1) A proposal for an indicative referendum petition, including the proposed
question,26 is submitted to the Clerk of the House of Representatives.27 This must be
accompanied by a prescribed fee, currently set at $500.28
(2) The Clerk publishes the question in the Gazette and newspapers as he or she
considers necessary and calls for comments on the wording.29 The proposer and other
persons as the Clerk thinks fit are also consulted.30 These comments and consultations are
19 (1992) 522 NZPD 6703 (Minister of Justice).
20 (1993) 537 NZPD 17611 (Hon David Caygill, MP).
21 (1992) 522 NZPD 6705 (Minister of Justice).
22 (1993) 538 NZPD 17963 (Minister of Justice).
23 (1992) 522 NZPD 6708 (Rt Hon David Lange, MID; (1993) 538 NZPD 17958 (Pete Hodgson,
MP); Hon Winston Peters, MP, above n 5.
24 (1992) 522 NED 6721 (Hon Dr Michael Cullen, Mph
25 For an official outline of the process, with a detailed schematic diagram, see How You On Have
Your Say: The Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (Law Reform Division, Department of Justice,
Wellington, 1994).
26 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s 5(1)(b).
27 Above n 26, s 6.
28 The Citizens Initiated Referenda (Fees) Regulations 1993, reg 2.
29 Above n 26, s 7.
30 Above n 26, s 9.
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taken into account in addition to other matters the Clerk considers relevant, in framing the
precise question (if the original wording needs to be modified at all).31 The Clerk is solely
concerned with ensuring that the wording of the question clearly conveys the purpose and
effect of the referendum and is capable of being answered by one of two possible
answers.32 The Clerk approves the petition form that will be used to collect signatures.33
(3) The Clerk publishes notice in the Gazette that the question has been
determined and the petition form has been approved.34 Within 12 months of this
publication, the promoter collects the signatures of at least 10 per cent of eligible electors
and delivers the petition to the Clerk.35
(4) The Clerk checks that the petition complies with the requirements. A sample
of signatures is verified.36 The Clerk certifies the petition as correct and gives it to the
Speaker·37who presents it to the House.38
(5) The Governor-General sets the date for the referendum within one month of
the petition being presented to the House.39
2 Holding a referendum
The referendum is held within 12 months (or 24 months with the support of 75 per cent
of the members of the House)40 of the petition's presentation to the House.41 In some
circumstances the referendum may be held in conjunction with a general election.42 The
31 Above n 26, s 10(2).
32 Above n 26, s 10(1).
33 Above n 26, s 12(1).
34 Above n 26, s 13(1)(b).
35 Above n 26, s 15(3).
36 Above n 26, s 19.
37 Above n 26, s 18(2)(a).
38 Above n 26, s 21.
39 Above n 26, s 22(1).
40 Above n 26, s 22(4)(a).
41 Above n 26, s 22(3)
42 Above n 26, s 22(4)(b).
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referendum is conducted in the manner prescribed by the Electoral Act 1993 for general
elections.43
3 Result of a referendum
The result of a referendum held under the CIR Act 1993 is not binding. It simply
"...indicate[s] the views held by the people of New Zealand on specific questions...".44
C Subject-Matter Restrictions
Most of the debate during the passage of the CIR Bill focused on the question of
whether results of referenda should be legislatively binding or non-binding. There was
very little discussion on subject-matter restrictions. Of the 66 submissions made to the
Electoral Law Select Committee on the CIR Bill, only two raised the issue of the lack of
subject-matter restrictions in the proposed legislation for a non-binding system. These
submissions expressed an apprehension that referenda on some topics could impinge on
minority rights.
The New Zealand Aids Foundation's submission expressed concern that right-wing
groups could use the CIR Act to play on fears and prejudices to win support for
discriminatory measures. This could result in a disproportionate influence of these groups
on policy making. The submission called for a restriction to prevent human rights issues
directly affecting minority groups from being put to referendum. It was noted that this
would preclude a referendum on issues relating to the Treaty of Waitangi.45
The submission of the Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group expressed similar
concerns about the potential for the CIR Act to be used by extremist groups to encourage
discrimination against minorities. The Group felt that the non-binding nature of referenda
would not adequately protect minorities since the strong public expectation that results
would be acted upon might induce Parliament to pass discriminatory legislation. The
submission proposed a prohibition on topics affecting fundamental human rights. The
Group also proposed that questions dealing with the following areas be prohibited from
being put to referendum: judicial independence, entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act
1956, the Bill of Rights Act 1990, and New Zealand's international treaty obligations (in
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). It feared that
questions on such matters would have a divisive effect. A statement by the Government
that it would not act on the outcome of a question relating to one of these sensitive areas
43 Above n 26, s 24. (The CIR Act actually refers to the Electoral Act 1956, which has been
repealed by the Electoral Act 1993.)
44 Above n 26, Long Title.
45 New Zealand Aids Foundation, Submission on the CIR Bill 1992, 11 May 1992.
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would undermine confidence in the political process. The Group felt that it was better to
impose limits at the outset.46
The Electoral Law Select Committee did not include significant subject-matter
restrictions in the Bill. This decision was supported by the Government. The Minister of
Justice said that the Government wanted the public to be able to voice its opinion on any
topic.47 This was one of the reasons he gave for making referenda held under the CIR Act
non-binding. He explained that a binding system of referenda would have required
subject-matter restrictions so that issues such as national security and foreign policy
would remain within government control.48 In the absence of an entrenched Bill of Rights,
subject-matter limitations would have been required to prevent the majority from
introducing discriminatory laws. The Government also thought that excluding certain
matters would unduly complicate matters.49
Government and Opposition MPs recognised the potential for frivolous, vexatious,
divisive or fruitless referendum petitions. Rather than suggesting subject-matter
restrictions, they declared that common sense and maturity must prevail to prevent
referenda on such issues from being initiated.50
The CIR Act was passed without significant subject-matter restrictions on referenda
held under the CIR Act. The legality of a general election, or some aspect of it, cannot be
challenged by a referendum under the CIR Act. Nor may a referendum call for an inquiry
into the way a previous referendum was conducted.51 A referendum petition may relate to
only one question.52 It may not deal with an issue which has been the subject of a
referendum held in the 60 months (5 years) prior to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives receiving the petition.53
An attempt was made in Egg Producers Federation of New Zealand v Clerk of the House
of Representatives & Ano,54 to infer an additional restriction that questions must be
46 Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group, Submission on the CIR Bill 1992, undated.
47 (1993) 538 NZPD 17952.
48 (1992) 522 NZPD 6704.
49 (1992) 522 NZPD 6710 (Hon Murray McCully, MP).
50 (1992) 522 NZPD 6714 (Chris Fletcher, MID; (1993) 537 NZPD 17611 (Hon David Caygill, MID.
51 Above n 26, s 4.
52 Above n 26, s 5(2).
53 Above n 26, s 11(2)(b).
54 Unreported, 20 June 1994, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 128/94.
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capable of providing meaningful guidance to Parliament and the Government. The
plaintiffs challenged the Clerk's determination of the precise question to be used on
referendum petitions, which was "[s]hould the production of eggs from battery hens be
prohibited within five years of the referendum?".55 The plaintiffs contended that a
referendum on the question could not provide meaningful guidance to Parliament and the
Government because it was framed in vague and emotive terms. The question did not
indicate whether egg producers adversely affected by the proposed prohibition would be
compensated. They also submitted that the Egg Producers Federation would be unfairly
disadvantaged by the wording of the question. It was not clear from the question that the
proposed prohibition could have a financial impact on consumers by increasing the price
of eggs (because of increased production costs). The emotive language of the question might
induce electors to sign the petition without appreciating the possible consequences for egg
producers and for themselves as egg consumers.
Eichelbaum CJ noted that "[i]t may seem extraordinary but...the Act provides no specific
guidance as to the scope or nature of the permitted subject-matter."56 (He expressed
concern that the Act provided no basis on which to exclude "vexatious, defamatory,
indecent or scandalous questions".)57 In relation to the first submission, he rejected the
argument that the Clerk must ensure the question is capable of providing meaningful
guidance to Parliament or the Government. In the absence of subject-matter restrictions,
there was simply no basis for this suggestion. This was true even if the question were such
that "...any sensible person would agree that the subject-matter does not concern
Government or is such that no Government would take action on it...".58 He rejected the
argument that the question was too imprecise and emotive to be valid, holding that the
Clerk's decision to approve the wording of the question did not fall below the standard of
Wednesbury reasonableness. He said that a question framed in truly emotive terms would
probably not meet the clarity requirementg and could not be put to a referendum
unmodified.60
In relation to the second submission, Eichelbaum CJ accepted that the Clerk is obliged
to frame the question as neutrally as possible within the parameters of the original
55 Above n 54,4.
56 Above n 54,6.
57 Above n 54,6.
58 Above n 54,7.
59 Above n 26, s 10(a).
60 Above n 54,7.
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proposal. However, since the question needed to be focused on a single issue, he found that
the Clerk had not unfairly disadvantaged the Federation in framing the question.61
Eichelbaum CJ's comment that a question outside Parliament's competence could not be
prevented from being put to referendum is obiter since Parliament was competent to
legislate on the question in the case. His position could be challenged by referring to a
subject-matter restriction placed on petitions presented to Parliament. The right to petition
Parliament is ancient and independent of the process used to initiate referenda. The
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1996 which govern such petitions62 do
not specify that the prayer must lie within Parliament's competence. In spite of this,
petitions will not be presented to Parliament if they do not meet this requirement.63 A
petition calling for a change to a foreign state's domestic law, for example, would probably
not be accepted.64 This is a sensible restriction since there is no justification for requiring
Parliament to waste its resources dealing with a request upon which it is unable to act.
The same restriction should be held to apply to petitions presented under the CIR Act.
There could be no justification for allocating resources to the holding of a referendum if
Parliament would be unable to act on the result. The counter-argument to the need to imply
in this restriction is that a referendum petition which deals with a matter outside the
competence of Parliament or the Government would probably not attract the requisite
number of signatures in any case.
II BACKGROUND TO THE FIREFIGHTERS DISPUTE
A Structure of the New Zealand Fire Service
The New Zealand Fire Service Commission controls the New Zealand Fire Service and
is responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs for its efficient operation.65 The
Commission is a body corporate established under the Fire Service Act 1975. It comprises
the Secretary for Internal Affairs and three members appointed by the Governor-General
on the recommendation of the Minister of Internal Affairs. In addition to controlling the
Fire Service, the Commission is required by the Act to take a co-ordinating and active role
in promoting fire safety.66
61 Above n 54, 1+15.
62 Numbers 348-359.
63 D McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (GP Publications, Wellington, 1994) 387.
64 Above n 63,387.
65 Fire Service Act 1975, s 14.
66 Above n 65, s 20.
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The Fire Service comprises professional firefighters and non-operational staff
employed by the Commission as well as registered volunteer fire brigades.67 There are
approximately 8000 urban and 3000 rural volunteer firefighters, 1800 professional
firefighters and about 230 management and support staff in the Fire Service.68 Fire
stations are staffed by professional firefighters or volunteers or a combination of both.69
Almost all professional firefighters belong to the New Zealand Professional
Firefighters' Union. The Union is the duly authorised bargaining agent for its members in
relation to employment contract negotiations. Derek Best is the Secretary of the Union and
Gordon Duncan is the President. The United Fire Brigades' Association of New Zealand
represents volunteer firefighters. It took a neutral stance on the dispute and the
referendum, saying that the issue did not concern volunteer firefighters.70
Maurie Cummings, as Chief Executive of the Fire Service Commission, is responsible for
employing Fire Service staff and negotiating their terms of employment.71 The Fire Service
Act 1975 also provides that the Chief Executive shall from time to time conduct reviews on
the efficiency and economy of the Fire Service.72 The Fire Service reports its performance
to the Minister through the Commission each quarter. An annual report is presented to
Parliament each year.73
B Funding
Eight per cent of the Commission's net annual expenditure is appropriated by
Parliament.74 The remaining 92 per cent is met by the proceeds of a levy on fire
insurance.75 Therefore the contribution an individual makes is largely proportional to the
insured value of that individual's property. It is estimated that 90 per cent of all
households in New Zealand make a contribution to the Fire Service funding through the
67 Above n 65, s 3.
68 Maurie Cummings (Chief Executive, New Zealand Fire Service Commission) Address to the
Pan-Pacific Conference, Christchurch, 22 February 1996.
69 Letter from Don Roper (General Manager, United Fire Brigades Association of New Zealand) to
Gabriela Wehrle, 4 June 1996.
70 Above n 69.
71 Above n 65, s 170
72 Above n 65, s 17E.
73 Above n 68.
74 Above n 65, s 47(2)(a).
75 Above n 65, s 47(2)(b)
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fire levy on insurance.76 Thus the Fire Service could be said to be publicly funded. The fire
levy rate is prescribed by Order in Counci177 and is currently set at 0.00062 per cent of the
total sum insured.78 It is reviewed annually by the Minister of Internal Affairs.79 In
1994, the total operating expenditure of the Fire Service was $183,502,000.80
Policy is separated from service delivery, as is customary in New Zealand's public
sector. The Fire Service negotiates a Purchase Agreement with the Commission each year.
This agreement sets out the outputs to be provided together with performance indicators.
The agreed price establishes the budget for the coming year.81
C The Fire Service Review
Lobbying by a number of key interest groups (Federated Farmers, the Business
Roundtable and the Insurance Council) prompted the Government to order a review of the
Fire Service. These groups contribute significantly to the Fire Service's funding through
fire insurance levies. The Fire Service was not to escape the reform which has swept
through New Zealand's state sector over the past decade.
The Chief Executive of the Fire Service Commission co-ordinated the review. It was
conducted by two teams which were given the same terms of reference and were directed to
present independent recommendations. The "Independent Review Team" consisted of three
prominent New Zealand businessmen. The "Internal Team" comprised two senior staff
members of the Fire Service.82 The review was completed in October 1994 and the
recommendations of the two groups, which were substantially the same, were accepted by
the Commission and the Government. The recommendations were to be implemented in two
stages. Stage one consisted of introducing a new, flatter management structure by 30 June
1995. Stage two, to be completed by 30 June 1996, involved negotiating a new employment
contract and roster system with professional staff.83 This would increase the number of
hours firefighters would be available for preventative work such as teaching fire safety to
76 A Review of Fire Seruice Funding in New Zealand: A Report Prepared for the Insurance Council of New
Zealand Wheeler Campbell Securities Ltd, 1994,11.
77 Above n 65, s 48(2).
78 "New Zealand Fire Service Reforms" (1996) 28 The Professional Firefighter 19.
79 Above n 65, s 48(3).
80 1995 Oficial Year Book of the New Zealand Professional Firejighters Union (Wellington, 1995) 65.
81 Above n 68.
82 Above n 68.
83 Above n 68.
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school children and promoting the installation of smoke alarms and sprinkler systems.
With the increase in productive hours worked by each firefighter under the proposed new
contract, the Commission envisaged that it would need to employ approximately 400 fewer
firefighters. An estimated annual saving of $28 million was forecast to result from the
implementation of these recommendations.84 The Commission did not propose to make
firefighters redundant.85
Up until the recommendations of the latest review of the Fire Service were implemented,
its structure was extremely hierarchical. National Headquarters in Wellington exercised
centralised control. A new management structure was introduced from 3 April 1995 as a
result of the review. Administration was decentralised so that the role of the National
Office (previously called "Headquarters") was limited to strategic direction, co-ordination
and audit.86
D Employment Contract Negotiations
The collective agreement under which professional firefighters were employed expired
on 24 February 1994. Attempts by the Union and the Commission to negotiate a new
contract have been protracted, acrimonious and unsuccessful. Prior to the review
recommendations being made, the Commission had offered a one per cent salary increase
and various other minor changes to the existing contract which the Union had rejected.
Upon the completion of the review, the Commission withdrew this offer and sought to
introduce a 56-hour working week contract in accordance with the recommendations.
Employees were offered lump sum payments of $8,000 to sign individual contracts. Few
accepted.87 Since fewer firefighters would be required under the proposed roster system, it
also offered an enhanced early retirement package to older firefighters to leave the Fire
Service which approximately 250 accepted. The Commission then embarked on a
roadshow, presenting the proposed restructuring plan to professional firefighters. It
received a negative reception. It was at this stage that the Firefighters' Union decided to
launch a referendum petition under the CIR Act.
Since the expiry of the collective agreement, firefighters have been employed under
individual contracts with the same terms and conditions of the expired collective
84 Above n 68.
85 Interview with Vic Hewson (Human Resources Manager, New Zealand Fire Service
Commission), 26 June 1996.
86 Above n 68.
87 Interview with John Devereux (Acting Secretary, New Zealand Professional Firefighters'
Union) 20 May 1996.
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agreement.88 Under this contract, firefighters are rostered on for 42 hours a week. 17.5 of
these hours, known as "routine hours", are dedicated to carrying out maintenance and
participating in fire prevention activities. They are on call during the remaining 24.5
hours. Approximately five per cent of this time is spent responding to call outs,89 There
are four "watches" or shifts. This means that at any one time, one shift of firefighters is on
duty while three are off duty.
Attempts by the Commission to solicit individual acceptances of their offer from
firefighters resulted in the Union taking court action. It sought a declaration and an
injunction to prevent the Commission from attempting to negotiate directly with Union
members. The Union submitted that the Commission, in communicating with its employees,
was trying to undermine the authority of the Union for collective bargaining. The Union
was successful in the High Court,m but the decision was overturned on appeal,w The case
demonstrates the degree of antagonism which had developed in the relationship between
the Commission and the Union.
III THE FIREFIGHTERS' REFERENDUM
A The Referendum Petition
In November 1994 the Union applied to the Clerk of the House of Representatives to
start a petition under section 5 of the CIR Act.
The Union's aim in initiating the referendum was to give the public a say in the future
of the Fire Service against the background of the reforms in health and education. It hoped
that a favourable result would apply political pressure to Government and encourage it to
reconsider its plans to negotiate a contract requiring firefighters to work longer hours.92
The referendum was also seen as a way to raise the morale of Union members and
encourage solidarity. A unified rejection of the Commission's proposals was seen to be
crucial to maintaining the Union's position.
The petition was approved in February 1995 and the firefighters set about collecting
signatures. They framed their campaign as a public safety issue, using the slogan "Sign to
Save Lives". They claimed that a reduction in the number of firefighters would undermine
the quality of the service provided. However, the Fire Service claimed that the Union had
88 This is in accordance with the Employment Contracts Act 1991, s 19(4).
89 Above n 85.
90 Itamy v New Zealand Fire Service Commission [1995] 1 ERNZ 724.
91 New Zealand Fire Service Commission v Ivamy [1996] 1 ERNZ 85 (CA).
,-f
92 Above n 87.
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not demonstrated a link between the number of firefighters employed and the quality of the
service delivered. It maintained that public safety would not be compromised by reducing
the number of firefighters.93 The Minister of Internal Affairs gave his assurance that the
time taken for the Fire Service to respond to fires would not be increased by the proposed
staff cuts.94
The firefighters were aware that their cause was associated in the mind of the public
with state sector reforms in general:95
There is of course an element of protest in the whole...campaign. The public are also
identifying with the firefighter in a two-fingered gesture to the Government. They have
had enough of Governments that have either hocked off or pruned back public services
without reference back to the electorate.
A rally of firefighters and PSA members was held outside Parliament on 28 February
1995. Then Alliance Leader Sandra Lee, MP, called on public servants and professional
firefighters to join with teachers, students and nurses in protest against the assault on
their living standards. Alliance supported the firefighters' campaign as well as the PSA's
pay claim.96 New Zealand First Leader, Hon Winston Peters, MP, also supported the
firefighters' campaign in the interests of public safety.97
A dispute arose regarding the petition for the referendum and the way firefighters were
collecting signatures. The Chief Fire Service Officer had issued a directive to its employees
to refrain from collecting signatures while on duty and with the use of Fire Service
equipment. (Rt Hon Mike Moore, MP, condemned this as a stand-over tactic by the
Government which stifled "freedom of information and free debate over the referendum on
Fire Services".)98 The Commission sought an injunction to prevent its employees from
defying the directive. The Union maintained that it had not directed the firefighters to defy
the Commission's directive. The dispute culminated in another court case,99 in which the
court refused to grant an interim injunction. The Union saw the Commission's action as an
93 Vic Hewson (Human Resources Manager, New Zealand Fire Service), Radio New Zealand
Interview (Morning Report) 18 May 1995.
94 Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs to Barrie Grant, 27 November 1995.
95 Above n 80,27.
96 Above n 80,29.
97 Above n 80, 31.
98 Rt Hon Mike Moore, MP, Media Release, 21 November 1995.
99 Fire Sen,ice Commission v Duncan [1995] 1 ERNZ 169.
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attempt to subvert its campaign,100 but believes that the case actually attracted publicity
for the firefighters.101
The Chief Executive of the Fire Service Commission predicted that insufficient
signatures would be collected within the year allowed under the CIR Act. In fact 100,000
signatures were collected within the first week,102 and around 400,000 had been collected
within two months.
The petition was presented to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Of the 4,656
signatures which were checked, 3,924 were found to be valid.103 On the basis of this, the
number of valid signatures on the petition was estimated at 290,000 by statistical
analysis.104 The electoral roll on 4 May 1995 and 9 May 1995, these being the dates
between which the signatures were checked, was 2,379,236 and 2,379,722 respectively.105
This means that at least 12 per cent of registered electors signed the petition.
B The Referendum
Cabinet initially agreed that a pre-referendum information pamphlet would be
distributed to each household at a cost of $182,946. However, the Chief Electoral Officer
exercised his discretion106 and decided not to proceed with the mail-out as he was unable
to collate and present relevant information.107 The reason he was unable to do this was
that the parties could not agree on the information to be put in the pamphlet. Each party
accused the other of trying to spread propaganda and lies.108 Thus no neutral summary of
the issues underlying the referendum question was provided to voters.
Ogilvy & Mather was contracted to promote the referendum on behalf of and in
consultation with the Ministry of Justice. This involved a media campaign aimed at
100 Above n 80,27.
101 Above n 87.
102 Above n 80, 27.
103 Letter from Murray Wicks (for the Chief Registrar of Electors) to David McGee (Clerk of the
House of Representatives), 12 May 1995.
104 Letter from Len Cook (Government Statistician) to David McGee (Clerk of the House of
Representatives), 16 May 1995.
105 Above n 103.
106 Citizens Initiated Referenda Regulations 1995, reg 2(3).
107 Memo from the Secretary of the Cabinet to the Minister of Justice, 14 November 1995.
108 Phil Whelan (Chief Electoral Officer), Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New
Zealand) 29 November 1995.
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making people aware that the referendum was to be held and informing them of where they
could vote. The campaign was also designed to encourage people to vote.
The referendum was held on 2 December 1995. The total cost of polling day staff,
returning officers fees, rental of polling places, printing of forms and booklets, stationary,
travel costs, advertising and publicity costs was approximately $9 million.
109
C Government's Approach to the Petition and Referendum
The Government was repeatedly asked by Opposition MPs, among others, whether it
intended to put the Fire Service restructuring on hold so that it could take the result of the
referendum into account.110 The Prime Minister replied that the restructuring would not
be delayed, particularly as the Union was using the referendum as a ploy to deal with an
industrial relations matter. 111 Labour Leader Rt Hon Helen Clark, MP, accused the
Government of treating the public with contempt in going ahead with the restructuring.112
The Government repeatedly discredited the question in the referendum as an emotive
one. The Minister of Internal Affairs referred to the Union's appeal to the public as
"emotional mudraking"113 and commented that "the public has been taken in by a rather
large dose of emotional clap trap".114
The Minister of Justice was critical of the subject-matter of the Firefighters Referendum,
and hoped that people would "wake up" to the fact that such topics are unsuitable. He said
the question concerned an industrial dispute, and that it was very difficult for the public
to understand the issues involved.115 (A member of the public included a similar comment
109 Letter from Phil Whelan (Chie f Electoral Officer) to Gabriela Wehrle, 22 March 1996.
110 Letter from the Hon Phil Goff, MP, to the Prime Minister, 9 May 1995 (In this letter Mr Goff
claimed that the referendum process would be farcical if the plans to restructure were
implemented before the public had voted. He said that if the Government was not prepared
to delay the restructuring, it should repeal the CIR Act to avoid a "fraudulent waste" of ten
million dollars.); Letter from Maxine Gay (General Secretary, New Zealand Trade Union
Federation) to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 26 July 1995; Letter from Derek Best (Secretary,
New Zealand Professional Firefighters' Union) to the Prime Minister, 19 May 1995; (1995) 547
NZPD 6625 (Rt Hon Helen Clark, MP); (1995) 547 NZPD 7111 (Sandra Lee, MP).
111 Letter from the Prime Minister to Derek Best (Secretary, New Zealand Professional Firefighters'
Union), 27 July 1995.
112 (1995) 547 NZPD 6626.
113 Minister of Internal Affairs, Radio New Zealand Interview (Morning Report) 18 May 1995.
114 Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs to AV Hunter, 26 May 1995.
115 Minister of Justice, above n 3.
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in his submission to the Clerk on the wording of the precise question.)
116 The Minister's
view that some questions should not be put to referendum seems contradictory to his
earlier statement that the CIR Act was intended as a mechanism to allow the public to
voice its opinion on any topic. (See part II C above.) The Prime Minister said that it was
impossible for the public to be able to make a decision on the question.117 The Minister of
Internal Affairs was similarly critical of the referendum question.118
The Union envisaged that a referendum arising from the petition would be held by a
postal ballot in conjunction with the local body elections.119 Cabinet rejected this and
said it would need to be held separately to avoid confusion. The Union has accused the
Government of holding the referendum separately to make it much more expensive and
thereby discredit the Union in the eyes of the public.120
D Outcome
There were 652,394 valid votes cast in the referendum. This was 28 per cent of the
total registered electors, the lowest ever recorded for a referendum according to records
maintained by the Chief Electoral Office.121 12 per cent of the votes cast were for a
reduction in the number of firefighters. 88 per cent were against.122
The Union was pleased with the turnout in light of what its describes as attempts by
the Government to discredit the referendum, and sees the referendum as a success. It
boosted morale in the Union and lifted public awareness of the proposed restructuring.
The Union believes that the result has applied political pressure even though the
Government has discredited the result on the basis of the low voter turnout.123
The Chief Executive of the Fire Service Commission has said that the Fire Service
Commission has taken the referendum result into account in developing its reform
116 Alan Thompson, Submission on the wording of the precise question, as per CIR Act, s 7(2)(b), 4
January 1995.
117 "Referendum Law Up for Review" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 December
1995,1.
118 Minister of Internal Affairs, above n 3.
119 Above n 87.
120 Above n 80,137.
121 Above n 109.
122 [19961 no 6 New Zealand Gazette 158-159.
123 Above n 87.
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strategies.124 It is not clear whether the result has actually had any impact. At the end of
1995, the Commission decided to introduce Community Safety Personnel to replace
firefighters who left the Service through early retirement or natural attrition.125 They are
employed under the same terms and conditions which were rejected by the Union prior to
the referendum. Under this contract, Community Safety Personnel have the same emergency
response duties as existing firefighters but spend more hours of their working week
involved with preventative work such as education campaigns. The contract provides for
a significantly lower salary than that paid to existing firefighters.126 The number of
firefighters employed by the Commission on 1 January 1995 was 1,819. By 1 December
1995, the number employed (including Community Safety Personnel) had been reduced by
69 to 1,750. There are no plans to further reduce the number of firefighters employed by the
Commission.127
Negotiations between the Commission and the Union in relation to the employment
contract of existing firefighters have yet to be concluded.
IV SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISING FROM INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BE
EXCLUDED?
As explained earlier, very little attention was focused on the issue of subject-matter
restrictions during the passage of the CIR Bill. Most of the debate centred around whether
the results of referenda should be legislatively binding or not. In a few instances, concern
was raised that the lack of subject-matter restrictions might allow referenda to be held
which threaten minority rights or are trivial or vexatious. However the possibility that
the CIR Act might be used as a tool in an industrial dispute was not addressed, much less
analysed in terms of whether it would be appropriate and how this might be dealt with.
The validity and practicality of the Prime Minister's assertion that questions based on
industrial disputes should be excluded from referenda held under the CIR Act will be
examined. This analysis will be conducted by specific reference to the circumstances
surrounding the Firefighters Referendum.
124 Above n 68.
125 Geoff Summers (Human Resources Strategic Manager, New Zealand Fire Service), Radio New
Zealand Interview (Nine to Noon) 26 January 1996.
126 Derek Best (Secretary, New Zealand Professional Firefighters' Union), Radio New Zealand
Interview (Nine to Noon) 26 January 1996.
127 Above n 85.
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A Factors in Support of Excluding Such Questions
1 Cost to the tax payer
Government Ministers categorised the subject-matter of the referendum as an industrial
dispute and claimed that it was a waste of public funds on that basis.128 It is interesting to
contrast this with the Minister of Justice's earlier statement that promoters of referendum
petitions ".,.have certain thresholds and obstacles to overcome. If they succeed in doing
that, it is right and proper, in my view, that the Government should fund the cost of holding
that referendum".129 In reply to a question in the House on the cost of the referendum, the
Prime Minister stated: "I have to observe that I would rather spend that amount of money
on extra education or extra health care 'rather than try to conduct industrial negotiations
by way of referendum".130 The Minister of Internal Affairs described the referendum as an
affront to the tax payer.131
The Fire Service Commission questioned the need to spend public funds on an issue
which only impacts certain areas of the country. It pointed out that only 20 major towns
and cities are serviced by professional firefighters employed by the New Zealand Fire
Service Commission and represented by the New Zealand Professional Firefighters' Union.
Most of the country is covered by a force of voluntary firefighters and would not be
affected by the proposed restructuring of the Fire Service.132 This criticism is weak since
most of New Zealand's population lives in these major towns and cities and could
therefore be affected by the proposed restructuring. Also, people from all over New
Zealand contribute to the funding of the Fire Service and therefore have an interest in the
way it is run.
Cost is a weak argument for reducing the potency of the CIR Act by imposing subject-
matter restrictions. Any form of democracy appears, at least in the short term, more costly
than a less democratic option.133 In the long term, a sense of involvement in policy and law
making, even if only to the extent of indicating public opinion in a referendum, must
enhance the legitimacy of the state's decision making processes and therefore of government
128 Above n 3.
129 (1993) 538 NZPD 17964.
130 (1995) 547 NZPD 6626.
131 Above n 3.
132 Dereck Broadmore (Solicitor for the New Zealand Fire Service Commission), Submission on the
wording of the precise question, as per CIR Act 1993, s (D(2)(b), 22 December 1995.
133 G Walker Initiative and Rerendum: The People's Law (The Centre for Independent Studies Ltd,
St Leonards (NSW), 1987) 94.
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in general. The cost benefits of ensuing social stability and compliance would certainly
outweigh the costs of holding referenda.
A more valid way of addressing the cost concern would be to investigate ways of
reducing the cost of holding referenda under the CIR Act. Sir Geoffrey Palmer has
suggested that postal voting, as used for local body elections, be introduced in the interest
of reducing expense.134 The Chief Electoral Officer intends to consider this possibility in
his review of the Firefighters Referendum.135 However, the Minister of Justice has said
that the Electoral Law Select Committee rejected the option of using postal balloting for
referenda held under the CIR Act and that he has no intention of introducing legislation to
allow it. 136
If people think that a referendum on a particular question would not be good use of
public funds, they will presumably not sign the referendum petition. Admittedly in the case
of the Firefighters Referendum, people were probably unaware of the cost of the
referendum which would follow. Now that people are aware of the cost they can be said
to implicitly approve of the expenditure when they sign the petition. Perhaps the estimated
cost of holding a referendum should be stated on the referendum petition forms used to
collect signatures. This would enable people to make an informed decision as to whether a
particular issue is important enough to warrant the public expenditure.
2 Unsuitable for public consideration
It may be argued that questions which are unsuitable for public consideration cannot
produce meaningful results and should be excluded from referendum to avoid fruitlessly
wasting resources. However, it is not possible to clearly define which types of issues are
unsuitable. There is general disagreement between politicians on this point. This is
illustrated by the following comments relating to the introduction of the Death with
Dignity Bill which proposed to legalise active voluntary euthanasia. Ian Revell, MP, made
a strong statement against accepting the Bill on the basis of a referendum result:137
This debate will resurface either in a more narrowly focused private member's Bill, or
perhaps, God forbid, in citizens initiated referenda, which would be the least acceptable
way of all for this sort of law to be made.
134 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Radio New Zealand Interview (Nine to Noon) 5 December 1995.
135 Phil Whelan (Chief Electoral Officer), Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New
Zealand) 1 December 1995.
136 (1995) 547 NZPD 7110-7111.
13 7 (1995) 549 NZPD 8719.
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Michael Laws, MP, on the other hand, saw the CIR Act as an ideal mechanism for
resolving the debate:138
Public morality is too important to be left to politicians. It is an issue that all New Zealanders
should be allowed their say on. This petition and the referendum will allow the public that
say and that choice. In many ways, this is exactly the kind of issue for a decision under the
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act.
A referendum on a question which is unsuitable for public consideration could
discredit the direct democracy process. Conceivably there are some matters on which the
public could not cast an informed vote. In matters of national security for example, the
Government is privy to information which is not publicly available.139 A referendum on
such a matter may produce a result which the Government feels compelled to ignore in the
interests of the public good. Such a situation would be undesirable because the
Government would be unable to justify its position to the electors without divulging
sensitive material. Questions which might place the Government in such a difficult
position would be extremely limited, and the Firefighters Referendum was certainly not of
this type. There should be no reason why the Government could not have explained the
impact (or the lack of impact) of the result on its Fire Service restructuring policy.
The fact that the question posed in the Firefighters Referendum arose from an industrial
dispute does not make it inherently unsuitable for public consideration. The United
Kingdom does not provide for citizens initiated referenda, however government initiated
referenda are held from time to time. While she was Leader of the Opposition, Margaret
Thatcher stated that if the kind of industrial disputes which brought down the Heath
Government were to reoccur, she would hold a referendum to decide who governs, "the
[G]overnment or the trade unions".140 Evidently Mrs Thatcher believed an industrial
dispute to be suitable subject-matter for public consideration, at least in some
circumstances. Questions arising from industrial disputes may be of legitimate public
concern. The question in the Firefighters Referendum arguably had a public safety
dimension and involved the allocation of public funds. Therefore the criticism that the
issue was not of sufficient public importance to warrant a referendum because it centred
on an industrial dispute was unjustifiable.
The Minister of Justice has said that the Firefighters Referendum question was
unsuitable because of its complexity and has given abortion as an example of a suitable
138 Michael Laws, MP, Media Release, 25 September 1995.
139 Above n 133, 127.
140 "Referendum is a Foreign Word" (1988) 138 New U 181, 182.
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topic.141 The Minister of Internal Affairs has said that the CIR Act should be restricted to
"big issues" such as the independence poll in Quebec or the Irish divorce referendum.142 It
could be argued that these issues are at least as complex as that posed in the Firefighter
Referendum. Indeed almost all questions of public policy or morality are complex at some
level. The Government's position that the question was too complex to be suitable for
public consideration was therefore unconvincing.
In addition to being of dubious validity, the Minister of Justice's comment about the
issues being too complex for the public to understand smacks of elitism. The belief that
people are capable of making intelligent and rational decisions about how they should be
governed is central to the idea of democracy. At general elections, electors are required to
evaluate the complex raft of policies upon which the various parties campaign. It is
unacceptable to suggest that they were incapable of understanding the issues involved in
the Firefighters Referendum question. If voters were uninformed, it was because there was
inadequate information on the issues available to them. This points to a flaw in the
legislation; there is no requirement that a neutral summary of the issues be distributed to
electors prior to the referendum.
An argument that the issue was emotive and that the public was therefore unlikely to
have considered the issues rationally would be extremely weak. Political parties
frequently include policies on emotional issues in their election platforms, yet no one
would suggest that this renders election results invalid. In any case, it would be
patronising to suggest that electors are incapable of rationally analysing issues with an
emotive content.
At its most basic level, the referendum result indicates that a significant proportion of
New Zealanders were concerned about the Fire Service restructuring. Concern about
public sector reform is precisely the kind of signal a direct democracy device such as the
CIR Act is designed to convey to Government. It is conceivable that the Government was
trying to discredit the referendum question as unsuitable for public consideration to
achieve a low voter turnout. This would make it easier to disregard the result and avoid
having to address the public's concerns about the restructuring.
3 Administrative rather than legislative issue
The Prime Minister defended the Government's failure to acknowledge the validity of
the subject-matter and result of the referendum by saying that the question dealt with an
141 Minister of Justice, above n 3.
142 Above n 118.
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issue of administrative detail rather than one of broad principle.143 The American courts
have held that initiatives may only be held on legislative matters. They are struck down if
held on administrative matters, an administrative matter usually being one concerned with
executive action carried out in pursuance of established legislative policy. The distinction
between legislative and administrative matters is unclear and is drawn on a case by case
basis.144 This restriction is seen as essential to maintaining the efficient operation of
government.145
Although the issue dealt with in the Firefighters Referendum could arguably have been
classified as an administrative rather than a legislative matter, there is no basis for
excluding such questions under the CIR Act. This is because the argument that such a
referendum may interfere with the efficient operation of Government does not apply to our
non-binding system since Parliament and the Government are not constrained by
referendum results.
B Factors Against Excluding Such Questions
1 Restrictions are unjustifiable
In relation to binding referenda, Walker has stated that the rationale behind direct
democracy tells against subject-matter restrictions.146 He identified national security, an
area in which the public cannot have full access to information, as a possible exception.
California and Switzerland's binding direct democracy devices which enable electors to
propose a question to be put to referendum are limited by only a few subject-matter
restrictions.
In Switzerland, the only subject-matter restrictions on constitutional referenda are
that each may deal with only one proposa1147 and that the referendum must target a
specific provision of the constitution. For example, if the old age pension is increased by
referendum, it is not the social insurance law which is amended but the relevant article of
the constitution.148 The Swiss Government's current proposal to substantially amend the
143 Letter from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 2 August 1995.
144 "The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California" (1966) 54 California L Rev 1717,
1734-1735.
145 Above n 133, 127.
146 Above n 133, 127.
147 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1874, art 121(3). (This corresponds to CIR Act
1993, s 5(2).)
148 D Butler and A Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of the Practice and Theory
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 1978) 43.
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constitution149 does not include further subject-matter restrictions on constitutional
initiatives.
The Californian constitutional initiative may deal with only one subject. It may not
name an individual to office, nor may it name a private corporation. The courts have the
power to strike down a constitutional initiative if it is in violation of the United States'
Constitution. A Californian constitutional initiative may thus not deal with subjects
which are reserved to the Federal Government, such as defence, interstate commerce and
foreign affairs.150
The second initiative device enshrined in Californian's state constitution is the
legislative initiative. A legislative initiative which is in violation of the State or Federal
Constitutions will be struck down by the courts. This is a significant restriction. The
Supreme Court has partially or completely struck down the majority of initiatives
approved in the past thirty years as unconstitutional.151 There are additional subject-
matter restrictions. Executive or administrative acts with a purely constitutional basis
cannot be addressed in a legislative initiative. Since legislative referenda may not address
legislation which contains an urgency clause, calls an election or provides for tax levies
or appropriations for the State's usual current expenses,152 the courts also impose these
restrictions on initiatives.153
The few subject-matter restrictions which apply to these direct democracy devices are
clearly designed to maintain efficient operation of Government and to prevent fundamental
rights enshrined in the constitutions from being eroded by the majoritarian potential of
referenda. Since the results of referenda held under the CIR Act are not binding, these
concerns do not apply in New Zealand and there is no justification for applying subject-
matter restrictions. If ad hoc restrictions were to be imposed for reasons other than to
address specific and articulated concerns, they would undermine the credibility of the CIR
Act. More specifically, further subject-matter restrictions would be unjustifiable in view
of the aims of the CIR Act. Restricting the subject-matter of referenda held under the Act
would thwart its objective of providing New Zealanders with a voice on any specific
issue to enhance their sense of participation in public policy making.
149 Reform der Bundesve#ssung: Erlauterung zum Ve@ssungsentwu,j- (Swiss Government Publication,
Berne, 1995).
150 Above n 6,183.
151 KW Kobach The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland (Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd,
Vermont, 1993) 243.
152 Constitution of the State of California 1879, art II, s 9(a).
153 Above n 6,187.
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2 Practical di#iculties with excluding such questions
Sir Geoffrey Palmer has criticised the Firefighters Referendum. He believed the topic to
be unsuitable for public consideration, but said that it would be very difficult to screen
out such questions while allowing issues which he considered appropriate (such as
capital punishment) to be put to referendum. He believes that the CIR Act is
constitutionally unsound because it interferes with the Government's accountability to the
electorate and should be repealed.154
If subject-matter restrictions were to be introduced, careful consideration would need
to be given to who would make the decision whether or not to accept a particular
referendum question. Opposition MPs see the Clerk of the House of Representatives' role
in determining the wording of the precise question under the CIR Act as political.155 The
decision on whether to allow a particular issue to be put to referendum at all could
potentially be much more political. The Minister of Justice has said that subject-matter
restrictions could not be applied without attracting allegations of Government
manipulation.156 If a decision to reject a question on a matter which is politically
embarrassing or which otherwise puts the Government in an unfavourable light were
made by a majority in Parliament or by a government official, it would certainly attract
such criticism. However, such criticism could be averted by vesting the power to exclude
particular questions on the basis of subject-matter restrictions with an independent
commissioner, committee or the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The decision, being an
administrative exercise of statutory power, would be susceptible to judicial review.157
A subject-matter restriction excluding questions arising from industrial disputes would
be very difficult to apply. In the case of the Firefighters Referendum for example, such a
provision could have been circumvented by classifying the question as a public safety
1SSUe.
3 Restrictions may become redundant
The issue of whether further subject-matter restrictions are required may become
redundant for two reasons.
154 Above n 133.
155 (1992) 522 NZPD 6722 (Hon Dr Michael Cullen, MP); (1993) 538 NZPD 17960 (Pete Hodgson,
MP).
156 Above n 140.
157 In relation to the Swiss constitutional initiative, the Federal Law on Political Rights 1976
(Switzerland), art 80 makes the Federal Chancellery's decision on whether a petition complies
with the technical requirements judicially reviewable.
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The public may become disillusioned with the CIR Act process, particularly if the
Government fails to take the subject-matter and results of referenda seriously in the future.
The tool may become disused, in which case further subject-matter restrictions will become
a non-issue.
The MMP environment, in which MPs are expected to become more sensitive to public
sentiment may open more attractive avenues of propelling issues into the legislative forum
than by initiating a referendum under the CIR Act. The CIR Act may then fall into disuse.
Alternatively, more MPs and the inability of a minority Government to progress
legislation quickly, may increase the use of the CIR Act as a means of introducing an issue
into a congested legislative system.
V CONCLUSION
The CIR Act was enacted to enhance public participation in policy and law making
decisions. One of the reasons for making the results of referenda held under the Act non-
binding was to avoid the need to devise subject-matter restrictions. This would leave the
mechanism for conveying the voice of the people to the Government and Parliament
unfettered. Public opinion on any issue of sufficient public interest to enable the requisite
number of signatures to be collected could be brought to the Government's attention.
The Firefighters' Union initiated a referendum under the CIR Act as a means of using
public opinion to strengthen its position in an acrimonious industrial dispute with the Fire
Service Commission. The use to which the Union put the Act was self-serving and
probably beyond the contemplation of those who drafted and passed the Act.
The question asked in the Firefighters Referendum was criticised as being unsuitable to
be put to referendum because it was concerned with an industrial dispute. As such, it was
complex and a matter of administrative detail rather than broad policy. These criticisms
appear to be invalid. Since the Fire Service is essentially publicly funded and its integrity
is a matter of public safety, the referendum was an appropriate way for electors to express
their concern about an area of public sector reform and call the Government to account for
its plans to restructure. A question without these public interest dimensions would be
unlikely to attract enough signatures to trigger a referendum.
Had some or all of the criticisms levelled at the Firefighters Referendum been valid,
subject-matter restrictions to exclude questions arising from industrial disputes would
still not have been justified. The aim of the legislation was to provide the public the
opportunity to voice its opinion on any matter of sufficient public interest to be able to
collect the requisite number of signatures. The question in the Firefighters Referendum met
this criterion. It would be contrary to the spirit of the CIR Act to exclude such questions.
The Prime Minister's assertion that the Firefighters Referendum has highlighted a need to
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exclude questions arising from industrial disputes from referenda held under the CIR Acf is
invalid.
Even if it were desirable to exclude questions arising from industrial disputes from
referendum, it would be extremely difficult to frame a subject-matter restriction which
could not easily be circumvented. Questions based on industrial disputes, particularly if
played out in the public sector, would often involve wider issues of public interest. It
would be difficult to justify the exclusion of such questions from referendum.
The low voter turnout does not indicate that the issue was unsuitable for public
consideration. Rather it was probably a reflection of the lack of neutral information
available on the issues and the Government's attitude toward the question. Its
trivialisation of the issue undoubtedly discouraged electors from voting. The
Government's attitude was arguably a manifestation of its lack of commitment to the CIR
Act as the first step toward true direct democracy.
The Government's failure to acknowledge the validity of the subject-matter of the
referendum and the result has undermined the credibility of the CIR Act as a direct
democracy device. It has done nothing to dispel the disillusionment which prompted the
calls for direct democracy legislation in the first place.
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